The United States has maintained extensive international hierarchies over the Western Hemisphere for more than a century and over Western Europe and Northeast Asia for nearly seven decades. More recently, it has extended similar hierarchies over states in the Middle East, and especially the Persian Gulf. This paper examines how the United States exercises more or less authority over other countries and, in turn, the domestic politics of subordination within client states. Most important, in a world of juridically sovereign states that are, in principle, formal equals, it asks how is U.S. rule accepted as legitimate? The core argument is that hierarchy benefits subordinate countries but has interstate and intrastate distributional consequences for domestic ruling coalitions and regime types. When the gains from hierarchy are large or subordinate societies share policy preferences similar to those of the United States, international hierarchy is compatible with democracy. Thus, American indirect rule has coexisted with democracy in West European since World War II. When the gains from hierarchy are small and the median citizen has policy preferences distant from those of the United States, international hierarchy requires autocracy and the benefits of foreign rule will be concentrated within the governing elite. This has characterized U.S. rule over Central America for much of the last century. In the contemporary Middle East, the gains from hierarchy also appear small and policy preferences are distant from those of the United States. Despite rhetorical support for democracy, even in the Arab Spring, the United States has consistently backed sympathetic authoritarian rulers. The paper concludes with an analysis of the tradeoffs between subordination to the United States and democracy within the newest states of the American empire.
This paper examines how the United States builds legitimacy for itself and exercises international authority over other countries and, in turn, the domestic politics of subordination within client states. The core argument is that hierarchy benefits subordinate countries but has interstate and intrastate distributional consequences for domestic ruling coalitions and regime types. When the gains from hierarchy are large or subordinate societies share policy preferences similar to those of the United States, international hierarchy is compatible with democracy. Thus, American indirect rule has coexisted with democracy in West European since World War II. When the gains from hierarchy are small and the median citizen has policy preferences distant from those of the United States, international hierarchy requires autocracy and the benefits of foreign rule will be concentrated within the governing elite. This has characterized U.S. rule over Central America for much of the last century. In the contemporary Middle East, the gains from hierarchy also appear small and policy preferences are likely even more distant from those of the United States. Despite rhetorical support for democracy, the United
States has consistently backed sympathetic authoritarian rulers. The paper focuses on the tradeoffs between subordination to the United States and democracy within the newest states of the American empire with a special emphasis on the "Arab Spring" of 2011.
Most studies of imperialism, and especially informal imperialism or indirect rule, take one of three forms: metrocentric approaches that emphasize characteristics of the dominant state (e.g., Hobson 1965) , pericentric theories that focus on attributes of the subordinate state (e.g., Gallagher and Robinson 1953) , and systemic models that highlight competition between dominant states (Doyle 1986 ). The theory developed below integrates insights from all of these approaches. However, I argue that the gains from hierarchy and how they are distributed between and within societies matter both for the incentives of the dominant state to create hierarchies of various forms and the willingness of any subordinate regime to yield more or less sovereignty to that dominant state. The greater the gains from hierarchy and the more they favor the subordinate state, the greater the likelihood that hierarchy will be legitimate and stable and that the subordinate regime will be democratic. This bodes poorly for the prospects of democratic hierarchies in the Middle East today.
Hierarchy in International Relations 2
Hierarchy exists when a dominant actor exercises political authority over a subordinate actor. By standard definitions, political authority is the right by A to command B to alter his actions. This right, in turn, implies a correlative obligation or duty by B to comply, if possible, with A's rule. B's obligation, finally, implies a further right by A to enforce her commands in the event of B's noncompliance. 3 In any authority relationship, B chooses whether to comply with A's commands, but is bound by the right of A to discipline or punish his noncompliance. Many drivers exceed the speed limit, for example, but if caught they accept the right of the state to issue fines or other punishments for breaking the law. Noncompliance by itself does not demonstrate a lack of authority.
International hierarchy varies by the extent of authority possessed by the dominant state over the subordinate polity, most sensibly disaggregated into the dimensions of security and economic policy. 4 Each dimension is a continuum varying from anarchy (no hierarchy) to complete authority over the subordinate in the specified issue area (see Figure 1 ). As continuous relationships, security hierarchy varies from alliances (anarchy) through spheres-of-influence (zones of exclusive political influence)
to protectorates, in which the dominant state controls entirely the foreign policy of the subordinate. Economic hierarchy varies from market exchange (anarchy) through economic zones (zones of exclusive economic influence) to dependencies, where the dominant state sets completely the subordinate's economic policy. The extremes are seldom realized, especially in the modern period, but we observe a large range of historical and contemporary variation (Lake 2009, Chapter 3) .
Political authority arises from many foundations. The right to rule has been variously understood to derive from the charisma of individual leaders (charismatic authority), tradition that is socially accepted and reproduced through ritualized ceremony (traditional authority), religious deities (religious authority), or law (formal-legal authority). 5 All have played a role in legitimating political leaders and institutions in different historical moments, and continue to play a role in the world today. In modern international politics, however, political authority rests largely on a social contract in which state A provides a political order of value to state B sufficient to offset the latter's loss of freedom incurred in its subordination, and B confers the right on A to exert the restraints on its behavior necessary to provide that order. In equilibrium, state A provides just enough political order to gain the compliance of state B to the constraints required to sustain that order, and B complies just enough to induce A to actually provide it. A gets a sufficient return on effort to make the provision of political order worthwhile, and B gets sufficient order to offset the loss of freedom entailed in accepting A's authority. If A extracts too much or provides too little order, B can withdraw its compliance, and A's authority evaporates. In this way, authority, contingent on the actions of both the dominant and subordinate state, is an equilibrium produced and reproduced through ongoing interactions. 
Extending Hierarchy in International Relations
The social contract between dominant and subordinate states implies that both must be better off in hierarchy than in their next best alternative, traditionally understood to be an anarchic state-of-nature. This implication is, in turn, embedded in the assumption that states are unitary actors. This has been a convenient assumption in my past work on hierarchy but it is clearly a simplification. In this section, I explore the distributional implications of international hierarchy between and within states. Doing so implies that 6 In this paper, I use a new measure of trade dependence that has higher criterion-related validity than the measure used in Lake 2009. The theoretical construct is dependence not just on the U.S., but rather seeks to capture trade opportunities outside the network of trading partners also dependent by the U.S. The old measure calculated a country's trade with the U.S. relative to its GDP, and then subtracted equivalent ratios for the other four P5 UNSC members (higher ratios indicated greater reliance on trade with the U.S. relative to the other P5 states). This was a measure of relative trade dependence. The division of the gains from hierarchy is bounded by the net costs to the dominant state of producing a political order and controlling opportunism by its subordinates and the value of that order and the costs of compliance to the subordinate state. Within this range, the division of the "surplus" gains from hierarchy between countries will be influenced by many factors, including the distribution of the gains within the subordinate state. I take up the cost and benefits to the dominant state and subordinate states in the first sub-section, and then the distribution of the gains within the subordinate state in the next; I conclude with new hypotheses that are then assessed for their plausibility in the second section of this paper.
Interstate Distribution
For the dominant state, the benefits of an international political order must be larger than the costs of producing that order, otherwise it will opt out and no hierarchy will exist, leaving both the dominant and subordinate state in dyadic anarchy or a stateof-nature. The benefits of hierarchy arise from two sources. Political order in general benefits all countries, including the dominant state. Following Hedley Bull (1977, 5) , a political order is "a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary, or universal goals of social life," including security against violence resulting in death or bodily harm, an assurance that property will not be subject to challenges that are constant or without limit, and an expectation that promises and agreements, once made, will be kept. In shorthand, we can think of political order as the protection of people, property, and promises. An international political order-or international civil society--limits threats to all states and creates opportunities for increased trade and investment and, thus, greater prosperity. Although not a public good, a political order benefits both the dominant and subordinate state, and potentially spills over to benefit third parties as well.
The dominant state, in turn, produces the political order for the benefits it receives from its own efforts.
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The dominant state also benefits from writing the particular rules of the social order. To write the rules of any order is an awesome power, and rulers even at the international level seldom fail to exploit opportunities to bias the rules in their favor. It is no coincidence, for instance, that the Pax American is a fundamentally liberal international order that promotes the territorial status quo; the free movement of goods, services, and capital across borders; and free enterprise, democracy, and other goals cherished at home (Lake 1999b; Ikenberry 2011) . The international order envisioned by Germany during World War II, and that propagated by the Soviet Union in Eastern
Europe afterwards, differed dramatically in their substantive rules and were designed to channel the benefits of political order disproportionately to Berlin and Moscow, respectively (Brzezinski 1967; Hirschman 1980) . The dominant state is constrained in how far it can bias the political order, however, by the need for the subordinate to recognize its authority; too much bias and the subordinate will prefer anarchy over the political order offered by the dominant state.
Hierarchy is costly to the dominant state in three ways (Lake 1999a) . First, the dominant state must produce the political order on which the social contract rests. Having promised, if only implicitly, to protect the subordinate from internal and external threats, it must do so credibly, maintaining a military force sufficient to deter challengers, intervene in support of the subordinate if necessary, and to enforce its rules. These costs are incurred whether or not force is actually used in assisting the subordinate; it is the capacity for action that matters. There are typically large economies of scale in producing security, suggesting that relationships of similar degrees of hierarchy will tend to cluster by region (Lake 2009b) . These costs to the dominant state are manifested in greater defense burdens for the dominant state and the propensity to come to the aid of subordinates in crises (Lake 2009a) . The costs of producing political order do not appear to vary considerably by the level of hierarchy (Lake 1999a) .
Second, the subordinate may act opportunistically and "defect" from the political order in ways large and small, reducing the benefits of that order to the dominant state. Asset specificity, however, is also endogenous and dynamic, meaning that it can evolve over time within a hierarchical relationship. Having entered a hierarchy with the United States after 1945, for instance, the United Kingdom specialized in mine sweepers for its navy, and the United States forewent a similar capacity, making the U.S. Navy dependent on Britain for these ships at least in the short run (i.e., until it might choose to build its own) (Lake 1999a) . Economically, specialization and the division of labor create over time deep dependencies on assets that may not be readily replaced, such as Middle East oil. As asset specificity deepens in hierarchy, one or both parties may become further "locked into" the relationship, creating both a tendency toward greater hierarchy to limit the potential for opportunism and "vested interests" who have strong stakes in maintaining the current hierarchical relationship (Lake 2009a) . 9 Thus, specific assets both increase the costs of opportunism, if it occurs, and reduce the probability that it will occur as interests become vested in the hierarchical relationship.
The probability of opportunism, in turn, is primarily determined by differences in the policy preferences between the dominant and subordinate state. If they share similar goals and visions for the political order, the likelihood that the subordinate state will act in ways that contravene the interests of the dominant state is low. When preferences are very similar, whether authority is exercised by the dominant state over the subordinate is, at an extreme, immaterial, as each would choose the same policies as the other if given the opportunity. The cost of giving up authority over its own affairs by the subordinate is low, but so are the benefits of governing the subordinate for the dominant state; under these circumstances, we would expect relatively little hierarchy. The greater the difference in policy preferences, however, the more likely the subordinate would, on its own, defect from policies desired by the dominant state. We would, as a result, expect the dominant state to exert greater authority over the subordinate in order to control its policy choices. But by the same reasoning, the greater the preference heterogeneity, the greater the probability of opportunism by the subordinate at any given level of hierarchy. This has important implications for regime type, developed below.
Finally, the dominant state also incurs governance costs in assuming responsibility for the subordinate's policies. The more hierarchical the relationship-the more policy areas the dominant state legitimately controls-the greater the governance costs (Lake 1999a) . At the very least, the dominant state must develop the bureaucratic infrastructure to make policy for the subordinate, as Britain did in its Colonial Office.
Even in lesser forms of hierarchy when policy is made indirectly through local clients, the dominant state incurs costs in propping up the regime, suppressing rebellions, supporting moderates, and so on. In all cases, the dominant state must also maintain the capability to discipline subordinates when they act opportunistically or challenge its authority.
Overall, the costs of producing political order, opportunism, and governing subordinates can be substantial. The level of hierarchy observed is the product of the expected costs of opportunism, which are decreasing in hierarchy, and governance costs, which are increasing in hierarchy. The outcome depends on the precise functional form of both sets of costs (Lake 1999a) . To sustain hierarchy at any level, the benefits to the dominant state must at least cover its costs. Whenever the benefits exceed the costs, the dominant state has an incentive to at least offer to exercise authority over another state, although this does not guarantee that the second state will agree to give up some measure of its sovereignty.
For the subordinate, the benefits offered by the dominant state must exceed the value of the sovereignty it yields in return. Unless it is willing to impose its will by force, which is both very costly and not authoritative in the sense I use the term here, the dominant state must leave the subordinate-or its rulers, as I shall argue below--at least as well off as in its next best alternative. The primary gain for the subordinate is the political order provided by the dominant state. This security commitment permits the subordinate to reduce its own defense expenditures and, in turn, to trade more overall and trade more with other states also subordinate to the same dominant state (Lake 2009a ). In a form of moral hazard, the protection of the dominant state may also enable the subordinate to make greater demands on others in bargaining, safe in the knowledge that the dominant state will be more likely to come to its aid should a crisis result; on average, as a result, subordinate states should have greater leverage in bargaining and get better deals with third parties than non-subordinates, although this has not yet been shown empirically.
The primary cost to the subordinate state is the policy autonomy it transfers to the dominant state. Sovereignty may be valued on its own, especially so in the modern world where it is taken as a mark of "statehood" and serves as a barrier to intervention by other states. Indeed, the principle of sovereignty is part of the international political order that guarantees the territorial integrity of existing states (Zacher 2001) , although compromised or partial sovereignty, which is still common, does not appear to vitiate this effect. Policy autonomy also matters, however, in permitting the potential subordinate to pursue its own policy preferences. The value of autonomy is lower for small states who often lack the ability to translate their preferences into policy. Nonetheless, the price of foregoing autonomy, like the probability of opportunism above, is determined by the distance between the policy preferences of the dominant and subordinate states. The further the ideal point of the subordinate is from that of the dominant state, the larger are the sovereignty costs to the subordinate. This implies that the closer are the ideal points of the dominant and subordinate states, the more likely they are to form a hierarchical relationship, all else equal.
The dominant state can also compensate the subordinate and induce it to yield sovereignty, however, by providing more order or less policy bias in that order. Increased order might be produced through tighter and more credible security guarantees, protection against a greater range of external and internal threats, or both. Reducing policy bias entails writing rules closer to the policy preferences of the subordinate state, say, exempting some economic sectors from trade liberalization, allowing permissible breaches in both economic and security commitments, and so on. The rules and how they are implemented are undoubtedly constrained by the bargains made with other statesgiven economies of scale in producing order, the dominant state will want similar rules across subordinates-but both are negotiable and can be tailored to the specifics of a hierarchical relationship. On net, however, the benefits of the order-both inherent and negotiated-must be large enough for the subordinate to offset the value of the autonomy lost by transferring authority to the dominant state.
Both dominant and subordinate states are constrained by their minimum thresholds. The dominant state needs to cover its costs of producing political order, the subordinate must value the order it receives more than the sovereignty it yields. Within these constraints, however, the dominant and subordinate state will bargain over the division of the surplus from hierarchy. Both sides have incentives to misrepresent their constraints. Seeking bigger shares of the surplus, the dominant state will exaggerate its costs of producing order and minimize the benefits it receives, while the subordinate will exaggerate the value it places on sovereignty. These negotiations are fraught, and prone to failure as each sides holds out for the best deal possible. The division of the surplus is, however, likely to be affected by three factors.
First, states that value the future more highly will be able to "wait out" their bargaining partner, forcing capitulations by the less patient party (Rubinstein 1982) .
Thus, dominant states that "need" the strategic resources of the subordinate will offer them a better deal, and subordinates that face acute security threats will "sell" their sovereignty more "cheaply." Bargaining skill and a host of idiosyncratic factors will likely affect how the negotiations pan out.
Second and more systematically, the bargain reached will be affected by the number of states competing for dominance on each side. Hierarchy tends to be exclusive.
Although there is, in principle, no reason why a single subordinate could not transfer sovereignty to multiple dominant states each with its own area of policy responsibility, this exacerbates the problem of residual rights in any hierarchical relationship and is empirically rare. In the modern world, at least, subordinates appear to yield sovereignty to only one dominant state. Nonetheless, the number of competitors for dominant status can vary by time and region. The more potential dominant states there are, the better the deal that the subordinate is likely to negotiate. Even within an existing hierarchical relationship, the rise of a potential competitor will likely lead to a more favorable bargain for the subordinate. 10 Conversely, if the dominant state can select between multiple potential subordinates in a region, it will also be able to play the possible sites off against one another and negotiate a better deal for itself. The structure of the international and regional systems matter for the distribution of the gains from hierarchy.
Finally, if the dominant state is willing to support an authoritarian government, it may be able to offer less and still achieve a mutually satisfactory bargain. The smaller the ruling elite-the minimum winning coalition or selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003)--the smaller the segment of society that needs to value the political order more than the sovereignty it yields. The next section develops this argument in detail. But the important point here is that, all else considered, the dominant state may prefer an authoritarian government with a small ruling elite because it can then retain a larger share of the surplus from hierarchy.
Intrastate Distribution
Even if the net benefits to the country are positive, this does not imply that all individuals or groups within the subordinate society benefit equally (or at all). Most important, if the benefits are unequally distributed, hierarchy may still be selected by an authoritarian elite which benefits from that relationship. How the benefits are distributed internally is a function of the domestic regime, and the domestic regime in turn affects whether hierarchy is possible and in what degree.
Societies differ in their policy preferences, discussed above in the context of the probability of opportunism within hierarchy. Societies that share common values, political ideologies, cultural histories, and more are likely to share preferences over the substance of international order and, especially, over rules regarding the appropriate relationship between states and markets, government regulation, religion and the rule of law, and so forth. Within society, moreover, different individuals and groups will hold different policy preferences, either because of their position in the international division of labor or for ideological or cultural reasons. Some will incline toward the policy preferences of the dominant state, others will oppose those preferences; given the liberal international order led by the United States, for instance, abundant factors of production within subordinate states will be more supportive of free trade and American leadership, while scarce factors of production will oppose them (Rogowski 1989) . By implication, those individuals or groups that are closer to the policy preferences of the dominant state will find the benefits of hierarchy relatively more attractive and can be compensated for the value of their country's lost policy autonomy more cheaply. In short, these supporters or "collaborationists" can be more easily induced to support hierarchy. Those individuals or groups that are further from the policy preferences of the dominant state will be opposed to hierarchy and will require greater compensation if they are to acquiesce in the relationship with the dominant state.
Collapsing what is undoubtedly a multidimensional set of policy preferences into a single "ideological" dimension suggests Figure 3 , where we can vary the distance between the policy preferences of the dominant state and those of the median citizen in the subordinate state. 11 Holding the benefits of hierarchy constant (including any additional sidepayments from the dominant state to the subordinate), the further the distance in policy preferences the smaller is the group of supporters of hierarchy. All else equal, each individual collaborationist further from the dominant state's ideal point must receive larger compensation if he is to support hierarchy. If the set of supporters who can be "bought off" under any division of the gains is less than a majority of the population, hierarchy is possible only when the franchise or selectorate is limited and biased toward those supporters. In short, the greater the policy distance, the more likely hierarchy is to be associated with authoritarian rule by a collaborationist elite.
From the last sub-section, however, we know that the dominant state is likely to gain disproportionately from hierarchy and may earn a surplus that is divided in its favor.
The gains from hierarchy for the subordinate state are not fixed and exogenous but, to the "cooperation under anarchy" is an equilibrium and no hierarchy is necessary (Oye 1985) , although it is cheap for the dominant state to create (since opportunism is low) and easy for the subordinate state to accept (since autonomy is not very valuable). In the southeast corner, the gains are small and preferences are highly disparate. The dominant state can only impose its will through coercion on a large scale, and any relationship that emerges will be regarded as illegitimate by the population and therefore not authoritative. Below the 45 degree line, hierarchy requires authoritarian rule, increasingly so as the benefits of hierarchy get smaller, policy preferences diverge, and the group that gains from hierarchy shrinks. Without adequate compensation to the median citizen, the dominant state must rule directly or through an indigenous elite that is closer to its policy preferences and gains enough on average to pay the additional costs of repressing its population. Unlike the unitary model (Lake 1999a; 2009a) , this implies that the subordinate state as a whole may not be better off, but only that a ruling elite is better off giving up some national sovereignty in exchange for hierarchy, net the costs of greater repression. 12 It also implies that broad-based opposition movements in authoritarian governments will be opposed to continued hierarchy. Such movements, however, will be out-of-equilibrium events likely produced by informational asymmetries on the part of the governing elite, the opposition, or both; their occurrence, therefore, will be largely random and unpredictable. Nonetheless, when they occur they will take on an "anti-" dominant state cast. On net, hierarchy is opposed by the median citizen and has served to enrich or preserve the authoritarian elite. Regime opponents, as a result, will mobilize citizens against the role of the dominant state in their country.
This implies the following propositions, which will be examined in the remainder of this paper:
1) The smaller the gains from hierarchy for the subordinate state, and/or the smaller the gains to the dominant state, the more likely the subordinate regime will be authoritarian.
2) The larger the divergence in policy preferences between the dominant state and the median citizen in the subordinate state, the more likely the subordinate regime will be authoritarian.
3) The governing elite within an authoritarian subordinate will be closer to the policy preferences of the dominant state than is the median citizen.
12 Although it might seem that this collaborationist elite would be more secure in its rule and have a longer tenure in office than other authoritarian rulers, this does not follow without additional assumptions about elite preferences over other dimensions. Some authoritarian elites may invest their returns in securing their rule, but others may simply divert the net gains from hierarchy to personal consumption (e.g., Swiss bank accounts) or particularistic policies that inflame the population. Indeed, given that the dominant state is providing a political order that may include securing them against internal threats, elites may be tempted in a form of moral hazard to expropriate even more from their populations than otherwise. Thus, although small benefits from hierarchy and policy divergence should correlate with authoritarian rule, they need not correlate with the length or security of rule for any particular regime. Under hierarchy, we may observe a simple churning of autocratic, rent-seeking rulers. Conversely, since in democratic subordinates hierarchy is likely to have broad-based support, parties will compete for office on other issues and hierarchy will be unrelated to tenure in office.
4) Broad-based opposition movements within the subordinate state, if they arise, will be opposed to continued hierarchy with the dominant state.
U.S. Hierarchy and Domestic Regime Types
Neither the gains from hierarchy nor the policy preferences of the dominant and subordinate states are directly observable or easily operationalized. The value of political order to both dominant and subordinate states is at least partly subjective, and the extent of that order is endogenous to the level of hierarchy that is constructed. To establish the initial plausibility of the theoretical extension developed above, I
compare U.S. relations with its Middle Eastern subordinates, especially around the Arab Spring, to relations with its Central American and European clients in earlier periods. I employ a narrative-based protocol that focuses largely on reasoned assessments of the gains from hierarchy, differences in policy preferences, the nature of the elite coalition in power and opposition movements, if any, and standard codings of regime type. This is not a test of the theory in any degree, but more a fitting together the pieces of a large and complex jigsaw puzzle so that the emergent picture seems reasonable given what we know about the real world. Rather than siding with the broad populations of these countries, the United States allied itself with these existing elites. In doing so, it reinforced the highly unequal and unstable political orders within these societies, which benefited the elites, of course, and shut off possibilities of political and economic reform that might have benefited the broader populations.
The informal American empire, thus, reinforced and bolstered authoritarian rule throughout the Caribbean and locked the landowning elites into the American system, as it was known. With American support, authoritarian leaders, in a form of moral hazard, became possibility even more entrenched and exploitative. As President Franklin
Roosevelt once remarked about dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo y Molina of the Dominican Republic, "he may be an SOB"--and here is the supposedly happy part--"but at least he's our SOB" (Lowenthal 1995, 24) . The net result was a political order that was highly skewed toward the United States and its local collaborators. Opposition to this order was relatively rare, given the collective action problems for the masses created by Union, the gains to the United States were enormous. 14 Europe also gained substantially by not having to pay solely for its own defense.
Moreover, after the war at least, the policy preferences of the United States and median citizen in most of Western Europe were relatively similar. All feared the possibility of future regional conflict, which had resulted in two world wars. Both the United States and Europe feared the Soviet Union, albeit to different degrees. And all supported the political order favored by the United States, with its reliance on embedded liberalism in the economic sphere (Ruggie 1983 ) and democracy in the political sphere.
The United States also shared its gains from hierarchy with Europe, first through the Marshall Plan and, later, through unilateral policy concessions, including tariff reductions in early rounds of the GATT, that made participation in the American-led political order more attractive.
The large gains from cooperation between the United States and Europe, the redistribution of some American gains to Europe, and their similar policy preferences all made hierarchy both possible and, importantly, consistent with democracy in the Europe.
With much greater social equality than in Central America, and past histories of established democracy, imposing authoritative rule in Europe after 1945 would have been difficult, and would likely have precluded the United States from creating its sphere of influence if it had been necessary. 15 But, in fact, the gains were large, broadly shared, and political preferences sufficiently similar that limited American rule over the foreign policies of its European "allies" was established democratically and to all appearances voluntarily. It was a limited form of empire to be sure, but as Geir Lundestad (1990) famously described it, it was an "empire by invitation." States in the region, however, benefit significantly from the political order produced by the United States. For decades, the United States has been the ultimate guarantor of the security of its subordinates. Israel, which is largely capable of defending itself and has defeated its enemies at every turn in the past, is nonetheless dependent on the United States for weaponry and as a protector of "last resort," to borrow a phrase from financial circles. As proven in 1991, despite billions of dollars of sophisticated weapons purchased from the United States, Saudi Arabia cannot defend itself against the regional forces potentially arrayed against it. This holds even more so for Kuwait, which was overrun by Iraq in one night, and the Emirates, which are equally vulnerable because of their tiny size. If its subordinates had to pay for their own security, either the political landscape of the Middle East would be very different, with the many small states consolidated into a few larger ones, or their defense burdens would be greater than now, potentially bankrupting all but the richest.
The policy preferences of the United States and the median citizen in the Middle
East are likely quite distant. Even absent U.S. support for Israel, a flashpoint for most Arabs, history, culture, and religion have conspired to keep the West and the Muslim world apart. One need not subscribe to the clash of civilizations to recognize that these are different and distinct societies (Huntington 1996) . Distant policy preferences along with small gains to the United States, imply as above that U.S. hierarchies, to the extent they exist, will be governed by authoritarian regimes. The benefits are simply not great enough to bridge the gap between the states, and the United States cannot compensate its subordinates enough to close it. 17 Pre-existing authoritarian states have permitted the small governing elites-more pro-Western than their populations, as expected-to appropriate most of each country's gains from hierarchy. Until the Arab Spring, discussed shortly, regime opponents have also, as predicted, been strongly anti-American.
From the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to al Qaeda, which turned its focus toward the "far enemy" after U.S. forces were stationed on holy soil in 1990 (Gerges 2009 ), radical groups shut out of power at home have recognized that the road to revolution runs in part through Washington, D.C. As in the Caribbean and Europe, though painted with broad brush strokes the pattern of relationships to date appear to conform strongly with the theory and hypotheses above.
The Arab Spring
The Arab Spring (and now Summer) appears at first blush to challenge the theory. The theory suggests a deep logic that appears consistent with recent U.S. actions.
Recognizing both the unique nature of the protests in each country, as well as the difficulty of capturing accurately a fast-moving set of events, the American response can be described as "the three S's:" support subordinate leaders who face only minor protests, stabilize subordinates when the old regime is no longer tenable, and subvert the regimes of non-subordinates. This studied silence must be interpreted as at least implicit support for the existing regimes. Nor did Washington condemn or even criticize Saudi Arabia's sending troops to support the embattled monarchy in Bahrain, also strongly backed by the United States. In
Qatar, on the other hand, the United States has actively praised the Emir for his support for democracy in the region, although there has been no significant reforms within his own country, and his military assistance in Libya.
In subordinate states with large protests, on the other hand, the United States strategy has been to support the regime until their demise appears all but inevitable, and then to seek "stability" through empowering the military or other pro-Western groups.
Fearful that the protestors may be or will turn anti-American, or that anti-American groups like the Muslin Brotherhood will leap to power in the transition, the United States has sought to support pro-Western elites, often associated with the old regime, and to limit political reforms to the bare minimum necessary to quell the protests. Thus, in Egypt, when it became clear that President Mubarak had to go to appease the protestors, 
Conclusion
In tyrannies, the ruler uses coercion to maintain power and control. By repressing society, the ruler rules but without legitimacy. This is a very costly and inefficient way to retain office. Most rulers use authority to maintain power and to work their will on society, and authority requires, in turn, that they rule legitimately with at least the acquiescence and possibly the support of some significant fraction of those they govern.
As Hobbes recognized, and as modern politics demonstrate, key to building legitimacy is the provision of political order that leaves society better off than plausible alternatives (Hechter 2009; Levi et al. 2009; Rothstein 2009 
